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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence is considered as a key technology. It has a huge impact on our society. Besides
many positive effects, there are also some negative effects or threats. Some of these threats to
society are well-known, e.g., weapons or killer robots. But there are also threats that are ignored.
These “unknown-knowns” or blind spots affect privacy, and facilitate manipulation and mistaken
identities. We cannot trust data, audio, video, and identities any more. Democracies are able to
cope with known threats, the known-knowns. Transforming unknown-knowns to known-knowns is
one important cornerstone of resilient societies. An AI-resilient society is able to transform threats
caused by new AI tecchnologies such as generative adversarial networks. Resilience can be seen as a
positive adaptation of these threats. We propose three strategies how this adaptation can be achieved:
awareness, agreements, and red flags. This article accompanies the TEDx talk Why we urgently need
an AI-resilient society, see https://youtu.be/f6c2ngp7rqY.
Keywords artificial intelligence · resilient society · generative adversarial networks · deep fakes · hoaxes
1 Introduction
In 1962, Martin Gardner described how to build a game-learning machine, and how to teach it to play and win [Gardner,
1962]. Gardner described hexapawn, a simplified chess computer, which can be build with 24 matchboxes. These boxes
are filled with colored beads. By shaking the matchbox, drawing a bead, the computer’s move is determined based on
the color of the bead. If the computer loses, it is punished by taking away the bead from the last draw. Figure 1 shows
the chess computer.
Interestingly, Gardner reported that two matchbox computers learned to play chess by playing against each other[Gardner,
1969].
“Several readers built two matchbox machines to be pitted against each other. John Chambers,
Toronto, called his pair THEM (Two-way Hexapawn Educable Machines). Kenneth W. Wiszowaty,
science teacher at Phillip Rogers Elementary School, Chicago, sent me a report by his seventh-grade
pupil, Andrea Weiland, on her two machines which played against each other until one of them
learned to win every time. John House, Waterville, Ohio, called his second machine RAT (Relentless
Auto-learning Tyrant), and reported that after eighteen games RAT conceded that HER would win all
sub-sequent games.”
Since 1962, when Gardner’s article was published, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has made tremendous improvements [Rus-
sell and Norvig, 2009]. In 1997, Deep Blue, a chess-playing computer developed by IBM, won its first game against
the world chess champion Gary Kasparov [IBM Corporation, 2019]. More and more games were won by AI, e.g.,
Go [Silver and Hassabis, 2016].
Most considerations and examples in our article refer to weak (or narrow) AI, i.e., AI that is able to solve a specific task.
In contrast to weak AI, strong AI (or super-intelligence) is defined as a machine with the ability to apply intelligence
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Figure 1: A simplified chess computer. Hexapawn is played on a
3x3 board.
to any problem. Strong AI is sometimes associated with understanding and (self-)consciousness, whereas weak AI is
associated with data processing and adaptation. Super-intelligence is considered to be far away.
AI tools are successful in many applications, especially in pattern recognition, e.g., speech recognition, image classifi-
cation, or big data analysis. There are many interesting articles available that describe recent developments and the
current state of this fascinating technology. Sullivan [2019] gives an overview by describing ten important moments in
AI. Benaich and Hogarth [2019] discuss the latest developments in AI research, industry, and politics in 2019. Crawford
et al. [2019] describes the social implications of AI technologies. Walsh [2018a] considers the impact AI will have on
our society, e.g., on work, war, equality, politics and, ultimately, the fate of humanity. We highly recommend the books
by Walsh [2018b], Marcus and Davis [2019], and Agrawal et al. [2018].
AI does not only affect everybody’s life, it revolutionizes our life. Google maps and similar systems have changed how
we navigate. But where there is light, there must be shadow. Since there is a very bright light in AI today, mustn’t there
be a very dark shadow? We will take a deeper look at light and shadow caused by AI in this article. We will focus on
the consequences for our society.
AI is already there, and will be there in the future—even during the next AI winter.
In general, we are fascinated by AI and want to share our fascination with society. However, we do not blindly follow
every new AI promise. So, this article is not an article against AI. On the contrary, we wish to attract people to AI.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents threats caused by AI. These can be based on failing AI systems
as well as on working AI systems. A classification of these threats based on the Johari window is presented in Sec. 3.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs), which are considered the most fascinating, but also the most dangereous AI
tools, are discussed in Sec. 4. The AI resilient society is introduced in Sec. 5. This article closes with a conclusion in
Sec. 6.
2 Threats Caused by AI
Modern technologies make our life easier and more convenient. But when they fail, they can cause severe threats.
Although this is true for every technology and not an AI specific problem, it is worth taking a look at some prominent
AI failures.
2.1 Where AI Fails
Translation We start with a hoax. Translate the phrase “the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” into Russian, and
then back into English. The result is:“the vodka is good but the meat is rotten.” This example is simply an
amusing story, but not a factual reference to an actual machine translation error [Hutchins, 1995]. However,
this funny idea made it to a late night show on TV: Jimmy Fallon and his guests take turns singing classic
ABBA songs, like “Dancing Queen” which turns into “Hula Prince” after running the lyrics through Google
Translate [Fallon, 2018].
Face Recognition Many countries are using face recognition in public places [nat, 2019]. China has been using
automated facial recognition techniques to educate people. For example, to shame jaywalkers their names
are posted on public screens. One camera seemingly caught a jaywalker, but it turned out to be a famous
businesswoman whose photo appeared on a bus advertisement. When the bus passed by, the camera took a
photo of her photo on the bus [NEWS, 2018, Liao, 2018].
Self-driving Cars The death of Elaine Herzberg. This was the first recorded case of a pedestrian fatality involving a
self-driving car [ National Transportation Safety Board, 2018]. She died of her injuries in a hospital after a
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collision with an Uber test car. The accident occurred in March 2018. The Uber car was operated in self-drive
mode with a human safety backup driver sitting in the driving seat.
Healthcare IBM Watson and healthcare problems [Strickland, 2019]. Oren Etzioni, CEO of the Allen Institute for AI
and former computer science professor, is quoted in Gizmodo with the following words [Brown, 2017]:”IBM
Watson is the Donald Trump of the AI industry—outlandish claims that aren’t backed by credible data. [...]
Everyone—journalists included–know[s] that the emperor has no clothes, but most are reluctant to say so.”
These failures can threaten society. But since they are known, countermeasures can be taken. The corresponding
algorithms could be improved [Martineau, 2019], so that, at least in principle, these threats can be eliminated.
2.2 Threats Caused by Working AI
Besides the threats caused by AI failures, there are AI inherent threats: even if AI does not fail it can cause threats to
our society. They might be intended, e.g., AI based weapons or unintended, e.g., AI bias [Winter, 2019]. Taken to the
extreme, super-intelligence can also be considered as a threat to our society [Marcus and Davis, 2019, Walsh, 2018b].
3 Known Knowns and Unknown Unknowns
What kind of threats are there? What is probably the most famous classification of these threats? What are the real
dangers and threats to citizens today?
In 2002 United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated in a U.S. Department of Defense news
briefing about the war in Iraq [Rum, 2002, CNN, 2002]:
Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know,
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown
unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.
Rumsfeld used a simplified version of the Johari window, which is used in psychology to help people better understand
their relationship with themselves and others [Luft and Ingham, 1955]. We will use the Johari Window to describe how
threats are recognized in our society.
3.1 The Johari Window
Rumsfeld mentioned known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns. But there is even more. The Johari
window covers four combinations: known knowns, unknown unknowns, known unknowns, and also unknown knowns.
Known knowns These are the threats that are well-known, taken care of, and discussed in public.
Known unknowns Known unknowns are potential threats, that we cannot determine exactly. AI systems improve, e.g.,
Kasparov was beaten by IBM’s Deep Blue. It is a known known that you may lose if you play against a chess
computer. Now consider that AI will improve more and more. This might result in some super-intelligence,
which is so powerful that it will enslave all human beings. OK, this a classical SciFy story. And a typical
known unknown, because the threat is known, but it is unknown, when it will happen—if it will ever happen at
all.
Unknown unknowns These are the threats we will never know in advance. Consider, e.g., radioactivity. Before it was
discovered in 1896 by Henri Becquerel, nobody considered this as a threat or predicted this as a threat.
Unknown knowns We claim that regarding AI, the main dangers lie in the “unknown knowns”. So, you may ask: what
are “unknown knowns”? Referring to the Johari window, these are the threats that everybody knows—and
ignores. They are referred to as the “blind spots” in psychology.
The Johari window is illustrated in Fig. 2. What are the blind spots in AI?
3.2 Unknown Knowns in AI
The unknown knowns in AI are related to privacy, manipulation, and mistaken identities. Unknown knowns are threats
that are ignored. Everybody knows about privacy issues with Facebook, WhatsApp, etc. But nobody really cares.
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Unknown unknown
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Translation errors,
Self-driving cars
 
? 
Figure 2: Johari window. A four paned window divides AI threats
into four different types, as represented by the four quadrants.
Known knowns are threats discussed in society, e.g., Google’s
translation errors. Known unknowns are threats that we are aware
of, but do not know when they will (ever) happen. SciFy stories
about super-intelligence can be mentioned here. Unknown un-
knowns are threats that cannot be predicted, they are not published
as SciFy. We focus on unknown knows, i.e., the blind spots.
Example 3.1 (Siri). Consider a popular “unknown known”: Siri. Everybody knows that there is not a real person
sitting in my phone and answering my questions. But what happens if we ask Siri about her identity:
Siri What can I help you with?
Question Are you a computer?
Siri I am not sure what you have heard. But virtual assistants have feelings, too.
Question Are you a computer?
Siri Well, I don’t wanna brag. But I got a B+ on the Turing test.
Question Are you a computer?
Siri I am share this information on a need to know basis.
This conversation looks funny—at the first glance. But Siri’s answers causes severe problems, which we will refer to as
mistaken identities.
4 Generative Adversarial Networks
Siri integrates several very sophisticated AI tools. The most recent, the most fascinating, and probably the most
threatening tools in AI are Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)[Goodfellow et al., 2014]. Why are GANs the
basis of the most threatening examples in AI? Given a large set of data, GANs can generate brand new data that look
like the original [Klimek, 2018a].
Example 4.1 (Deep Fakes). Consider the web page https://thispersondoesnotexist.com. The people shown
on these photos look real, but they do not exist. These are Deep Fakes generated using GANs.
You may think that image manipulation is not really new and was used even before Photoshop was available. So, what
is different today, what changed? The difference is three-fold: First, processors are much faster than 40 years ago.
Second, there are more data. Third, GANs use a very clever strategy.
Gardner described two computers that play against each other [Gardner, 1969]. They used essentially the same
strategy, they are somehow symmetric. GANs also play against each other, but in a very sophisticated manner. They
use asymmetric algorithms. GANs are neural network-based architectures that use two models, a generator and a
discriminator.
Example 4.2 (Counterfeit Money). Imagine the following situation. The two models are running on two computers:
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Figure 3: GANs creating counterfeit money. This process does not require any human interaction. Left: The first counterfeit note.
Center: Improved counterfeit note. Right: Result after several billion iterations. Final counterfeit note [Kalina, 2018].
1. The first computer (generator), say A, creates fake images, e.g., counterfeit money.
2. The second computer (discriminator), say B, says “that’s fake” and gives feedback.
3. A uses this feedback to make new money and shows it to B again.
4. B says “that’s fake” and gives more feedback.
This cycle is repeated a several billion times, very quickly. The counterfeit money improves over time—without human
intervention. Ultimately humans cannot distinguish whether the result is fake or real. This process is illustrated in
Fig. 3. A similar example is presented in Klimek [2018b].
There are several introductions to GANs, e.g., Honchar [2019], Horev [2018], Karras et al. [2018, 2019]. Before reading
these papers, it is worth watching some of the inspiring videos, e.g., Steenbrugge [2019].
Given a large set of data, the GAN is capable of generating completely new data indistinguishable from the original.
This is the basis of the most threatening examples. To counterfeit money is only a simple example. The really ugly and
threatening stuff happens, if people are involved. GANs can create new identities by combining features from different
objects, e.g., faces. These images were generated by copying a specified subset of styles from the first source and taking
the rest from a second source [Brock et al., 2018].
Example 4.3 (Face App). GANs are also used in aging or de-aging programs. You might know or even have used the
FaceApp program, which nicely shows how you will look in ten or twenty years [Fac, 2019]. FaceApp is based on
GANs. And there are many more applications, e.g., GANs can also be used to determine the looks of a baby from the
photos of its parents.
More than 40 years ago, science magazines explained how to build matchbox chess computers [Gardner, 1962]. Today,
the same magazine describes how deep fake videos can be produced [Wha, 2019]. Everybody, who has access to
the internet, can create fake videos/images [Nag, 2017]. This is a national security threat, because GANs can also
create fake videos/images of important people that look real. Combining fake news with deep fakes produces powerful
propaganda, which can be distributed on the internet very quickly (using twitter or facebook). GANs can affect personal
safety and national security [Hsu et al., 2018]. The potential for bad is there. Think about elections, where false news
articles flooded almost all social media platforms Andres [2019]. Imagine the impact these articles would have had if
they had contained accompanying “false images”, “false audio”, or even “false video”.
Example 4.4 (Deep-faking photos of the earth). A dangerous AI-enabled weapon is deep-faking photos of the earth.
First, AI is used to make undetectable changes to outdoor photos. Then these photos are released into the open-source
world. Todd Myers, automation lead for the CIO-Technology Directorate at the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, warns [Tucker, 2019]:
“Forget about the [Department of Defense] and the [intelligence community]. Imagine Google
Maps being infiltrated with that, purposefully? And imagine five years from now when the Tesla
[self-driving] semis are out there routing stuff?”.
And there are many more applications [Nowlin, 2018]: Password Cracking [Klimek, 2018a], hiding malware [Klimek,
2018a, Rigaki and Garcia, 2018], or speech synthesis [Dessa, 2019].
5 AI Resilient Society
What can you do if you discover a deep-fake of your own? Nowadays, this remains an open question. There is no quick
solution available. That is where an AI resilient society comes into play! You may ask: Why should our society be
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involved? Why can’t this problem be solved by the AI experts using technological measures, e.g., by using anti-GAN
software (similar to anti-virus software)?
Related attempts exist. Hsu et al. [2018] developed a Deep Forgery Discriminator (DeepFD). And for sure, programmers
should engineer their systems with GANs in mind. Unfortunately, GANs are very tricky: they learn by playing
against each other, so they may improve by playing against anti-GAN software. Furthermore, experience shows that
technological countermeasures results in counter-countermeasures—this is an infinite loop.
Since technological countermeasures can only temporarily solve the problem, our society should be involved. There are
success stories from history that illustrate how our society can cope with technological threats. Consider, e.g, nuclear
bombs or the ozone hole. These were severe threats, but we found ways to manage them.
Common to these threats is that the corresponding technologies were not discussed behind closed doors or only in the
ivory tower. At least, after some time, they were discussed in public. Public engagement resulted in agreements, rules,
and laws. But laws can only be decided upon if there are known knowns. So, known knowns are the cornerstones of an
AI resilient society.
Based on these ideas, we are able to define the term AI-resilient society.
Definition 1 (AI Resilient Society). An AI resilient society is able
1. to transform the unknown knowns to known knowns and
2. to develop rules (laws) for the known knowns.
Resilience can be seen as a positive adaptation of these threats.
In the following section, we will mention three important strategies how this adaptation can happen: awareness,
agreements, and red flags. Note, AI resilience describes a property of the society, and not a feature of the AI technology.
5.1 Awareness
Awareness can be generated by publishing papers and giving public talks, e.g., the corresponding TEDx talk to this
paper [Bartz-Beielstein, 2019]). And there are many more ways to create awareness.
Example 5.1 (Simple truth). We should promote simple truths. Every child should know: “If you’re not paying for the
product (e.g., FaceApp), you are the product.” That’s an famous saying from Steve Jobs—but it is ignored by many
people today.
Example 5.2 (Hoax identification). Janne Ahlberg, a security professional from Finland, maintains a blog to identify
fake or hoax pictures [Ahlberg, 2019].
Example 5.3 (Fact checking). There is a list of fact checking websites on Wikipedia [Wikipedia contributors, 2019]. It
includes websites that provide fact-checking services about both political and non-political subjects.
Example 5.4 (Reverse image search). You can use reverse image search. Tools such as TinEye help you to search
by image or perform what reverse image searches [Tin, 2019]. This short video explains how to perform reverse
image search on a mobile phone: https://youtu.be/0oLFjxtvPIM. But, beware: “Google reverse image search
results—especially the suggested text—should not be trusted. Google simply picks up the most used keywords. You can
and sometimes should try different keywords for the image you are searching.”, see https://hoaxeye.com/2019/
07/15/reverse-searching-images/
Example 5.5 (Challenges). In October 2019, Facebook, Microsoft, and academics came together to build the Deep-fake
Detection Challenge [Facebook Designated Agent, 2019].
Example 5.6 (Information). The WITNESS Media Lab is hosting the project Prepare, Don’t Panic: Synthetic Media
and Deepfakes. They have compiled a list of “twelve things we can do now to prepare for deepfakes” [WITNESS
Media Lab, 2019]. The WITNESS Media Lab supports citizens and grassroots groups documenting human rights abuse
with video. It is a collaboration with the News Lab at Google.
Example 5.7 (Think critically about AI). Marcus and Davis [2019] states that it is “increasingly important that we be
able to sort out AI hype and AI reality.” AI limits should discussed publicly. In a recent article, Chollet [2019] describes
how to measure intelligence.
5.2 Agreements
An AI resilient society benefits from principles and laws proposed by scientists, writers, or experts [Allen, 2019].
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Example 5.8 (Asimov’s laws). Consider Asimov‘s laws—you might remember the film “I, Robot” [Asimov, 1950]:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First
Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Law.
In 2010, the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC), the main UK government body that funds
AI research, defined principles for roboticist. Similar initiatives, that develop agreements, are needed.
Example 5.9 (Partnership on AI). Google, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft and Facebook announced a “Partnership on AI to
benefit people and society.” [Par, 2019].
Example 5.10 (Dual use of concern). The so-called dual-use risk describes the risk that a technology, which was
primarily developed for a civilian, “good” purpose, is being alienated for potentially unethical, public-endangering
use. An interdisciplinary research project at TU Darmstadt deals with the evaluation of dual-use risks in software
development [Reuter and Nordmann, 2018].
Example 5.11 (Science magazines, podcasts). We need to decide on the acceptable use of AI technologies such as
automated facial recognition nat [2019]. And we should discuss how to build in safeguards to protect human rights.
Articles in science magazines or podcasts can initiate this discussion, e.g., trustworthy AI is discussed by Metzinger
[2019]. He claims that ethics have also economical aspects.
Example 5.12 (Discussion papers). The Australian Human Rights Commission has published a discussion paper that
presents preliminary views on protecting and promoting human rights amid the rise of new technologies Australian
Human Rights Commission [2019].
Example 5.13 (Bloxberg). The Max Planck Digital Library established the research project bloxberg, which provides a
trusted research infrastructure. The bloxberg infrastructure is a secure global blockchain established by a consortium of
leading research organizations. It enables trusted data management, communication, and collaboration [Blo, 2019].
5.3 Walsh’s Red Flags
One important safeguard against AI-based threats was proposed by Toby Walsh, who introduced red flags [Walsh,
2016]. The red flag idea was motivated by the Locomotive Act from 1865: concerned about the impact of motor vehicles
on public safety, the British parliament required a person to walk in front of any motorized vehicle with a red flag to
signal the oncoming danger.
In view of today’s traffic situations, the Locomotive Act sounds crazy. But consider the following, modern variant of
the red flag idea that was agreed upon in California in September 2004: governor A. Schwarzenegger signed legislation
that prohibits the public display of toy guns unless they are clear or painted a bright color, in order to differentiate them
from real firearms [Salladay, 2004].
Having AI systems in mind, Walsh defined the Turing Red Flag Law as follows [Walsh, 2016]:
“An autonomous system should be designed so that it is unlikely to be mistaken for anything besides
an autonomous system, and should identify itself at the start of any interaction with another agent.”
Walsh’s idea is discussed among the AI experts worldwide. The High-Level Expert Group on AI, which was set up by
the European Commission, recommended red flags in the following manner [Smuha, 2019]:
Introduce a mandatory self-identification of AI systems. In situations where an interaction takes
place between a human and an AI system, and whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that end
users could be led to believe that they are interacting with a human, deployers of AI systems should
be attributed a general responsibility to disclose that in reality the system is non-human. This goes
hand-in-hand with ensuring the transparency of AI systems.
There are several ways, how red flags can be implemented.
Example 5.14 (Computer generated text). Whenever computer generated text, e.g., news or radio comments, is
broadcasted, a red flag should come up.
Example 5.15 (Siri et al.). It should be good style for Siri, Alexa, and all the others to correctly answer questions about
their identities. 1
1Maybe Tim Cook will read this article some day.
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Figure 4: AI-resilient society in one figure. Unknown knows are
transformed into known knowns.
6 Conclusion
The AI genie is out of the bottle and we cannot put it back. We cannot trust data, images, audio, video, and identities
any more. That’s why we urgently need an AI resilient society, which is based on openness and knowledge transfer.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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